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Abstract 
This paper reports the preliminary findings of an empirical investigation into the process 
of appointing non-executive directors and their motivations behind the adoption of the 
position.  While research into the board of directors has been extensive, little deliberation 
has been given to the motives of non-executives who choose to sit on boards (Roberts, 
2002). Given that the board of directors has been charged with much more responsibility 
in recent years and is being held to a higher level of accountability than would 
historically be expected (Donnelly and Kelly, 2005), the choice of non-executives to 
continue to take up roles on boards is an interesting one and as such warrants academic 
attention. Many of the directors interviewed acknowledged that the remuneration 
received for the position did not fully compensate for the personal liability they exposed 
themselves to and as such was not an appropriate determinant of motive. Instead non-
executive directors interviewed presented motivations such as the valid contribution they 
had to offer, or merely viewed the acceptance of non-executive positions as part of the 
job.  
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The validity of nomination and selection procedures demonstrated by Irish companies in 
sourcing non-executive directors has been highlighted as a consistent source of concern 
(O'Higgins, 2002, Brennan and McDermott, 2004, O'Regan et al., 2005). By focusing on 
the nomination of non-executive directors it is hoped that some insight will be gained as 
to the level of commitment organizations have made to implementing good corporate 
governance.  
 
For the purpose of the study qualitative research in the form of semi-structured interviews 
with non-executive directors was carried out. This research method has been chosen as 
semi-structured interviews offer a focused approach to questioning, while allowing for 
greater probing and interaction with the interviewee than other methods provide. The 
non-executive directors interviewed demonstrated a lack of consistent viewpoint 
regarding the nominations process of organizations. Whereas some non-executive 
directors interviewed suggest the nominations procedure is a robust process, others would 
view it as the job of the chairman and have little or no knowledge of any actual procedure 
in place.  
 
Introduction 
Stemming from the financial scandals of the 1990s and the resulting corporate 
governance initiatives established (Lannoo, 1999), the board of directors has faced 
increased scrutiny. In particular non-executive directors of plc boards have been met with 
a substantial rise in responsibilities both from legal and other standpoints. Although the 
Cadbury Report (1992) and it’s successors attempted to address many areas that were 
viewed as contributing to poor corporate governance, the board of directors was given by 
far the most weight.  
 
While the board of directors as a whole has received much attention in both the academic 
literature and governmental reports on corporate governance, the non-executive directors 
of the board have been singled out as a very important group (Petra, 2005, Dahya and Mc 
Connell, 2007). Investigations into board role and composition often center around the 
expectations placed on non-executive directors and as a result the effects of their 
appointment to the board have been thoroughly reviewed (Baysinger and Butler, 1985, 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991, Mc Intyre et al., 2007). However there is a paucity of 
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research on the nominations procedures for non-executive directors and their motivations 
for adopting the position. By presenting the preliminary findings from a study of the 
appointment process for Irish non-executive directors and the motivations behind their 
acceptance of the position this paper begins to address the defecit in the literature. 
 
This paper adopts the following structure: The research into the board of directors has 
been informed by literature surrounding the effect of corporate governance on this 
function and as such the literature regarding this area is addressed in the first section. 
From this, the research methodology adopted is outlined in section two. The third section 
outlines the key insights drawn from the interview process. This paper concludes with a 
discussion of these findings and the limitations of the research.  
 
Regulatory Environment 
The regulatory structure of a country is an important determinant of the corporate 
governance practices that are employed by the organizations operating in that 
environment. As such it contributes to our understanding of the board of directors and its 
various functions. Corporate governance reform has been a major focus in developed 
countries since the financial scandals of the 1990s (Child and Rodrigues, 2004, Cullinan, 
2004). The Cadbury Report (1992) and it’s successors such as the Higgs Review (2003) 
informed the subsequent Combined Code of Corporate Governance (2006). The Code 
itself offers a principles based approach to governance whereby those listed companies 
that do not comply with the Code are expected to outline the reasons why under its 
‘comply or explain’ rule (Mintz, 2005). The Combined Code adopts an agency 
perspective to corporate governance reform with many of its recommendations focused 
on shareholder protection and director accountability (Code, 2006).  
 
A common law system is in operation in both the UK and Ireland and is often used as an 
explanation for the similar corporate governance initiatives in place (Berglof, 1997, 
Oughe and De Langhe, 2002). The adoption of the Combined Code as a standard of 
corporate governance for companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange is one such 
example. The passing of the Company Law Enforcement Act of 2001 established the 
Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement in Ireland (ODCE) (Heneghan and 
O'Donnell, 2007). The initiative itself is a solely Irish one and as such it is important to 
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address it and the possible effect it has on corporate governance practice in Ireland. The 
aim of the ODCE is to ensure that all companies observe the rules of the relevant 
companies acts and to enforce any regulations which are not being met (ODCE, 2001). 
As Donnelly and Kelly (2005) note, listing on the ISE requires companies to make 
disclosure statements in their annual reports of their compliance with the Combined 
Code. That is not to say all recommendations regarding governance are met. Brennan and 
Mc Dermott (2004) suggest that there are still issues of independence that need to be 
addressed regarding non-executive directors of Irish boards. Given that the ODCE is a 
solely Irish initiative, it is arguably better able to address the corporate governance 
problems present in Ireland today. Heneghan and O’Donnell (2007) support the 
establishment of the ODCE and note that the contribution of the ODCE to Irish 
governance has been positive and has helped to foster a culture of compliance. As 
mentioned previously, the regulatory environment can greatly affect the corporate 
governance practices of organizations and as such it is important to be familiar with such 
areas when researching the board of directors.  
 
A number of areas surrounding the board of directors in particular have been examined in 
the various reports undertaken on corporate governance in the UK. Letze, et al. (2008) 
outline the various reports in some detail. The Cadbury Report (1992) began the 
discussion by recommending what the reporting functions of directors should be. The 
Greenbury Report (1995) continued with a focus on director remuneration and the 
Hampel Report (1998) reviewed the findings of the previous reports while continuing to 
make recommendations. Finally the Higgs Review (2003) outlined the proposed role that 
non-executive director should take. Given the amount of attention that the board of 
directors has received, it would be fair to say that it is considered an important 
determinant of a company’s governance standards and as such warrants academic 
attention.  
 
Theoretical Perspectives 
While agency theory has been the traditional lens through which corporate governance 
practices have been viewed, it has been subject to increased criticism recently. Some 
authors describe the view that executive directors are acting on self serving interests as 
overly harsh (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, Hendry, 2005). Furthermore, using non-
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executive directors to monitor executive actions may damage managerial motivation 
rather than protecting shareholder interests. However, a number of other theories have 
been highlighted as offering suitable explanations of organizational behavior, and while 
they have yet to be included in reports on corporate governance, the academic literature 
supports the possibility that they inform governance perspectives as much as agency 
theory might (Scott, 1987, Hung, 1998).  
 
Such perspectives include the resource dependence theory of the firm and legitimacy 
theory. While many theories have examined and acknowledge the role that the board of 
directors plays within an organization (Roberts et al., 2005, Hendry, 2005), resource 
dependence theory attempts to explain the function of the board as a mechanism for 
interacting with the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). The main 
proposal of resource dependence theory is that a firm reacts to its reliance on the external 
environment by using the board of directors as a tool to manage this dependence 
(Hillman et al, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Unlike other perspectives, 
resource dependence theory is specifically focused on the board of directors and how 
they are utilized by the organization. Given that this paper considers the nominations 
practices of boards it would be remiss then to ignore the possibilities that some 
organizations appoint non-executive directors based on their connection to the external 
environment.  
 
Legitimacy theory offers yet another perspective on organizational actions. It considers 
the need for organizations to act within the social boundaries of the environments they 
operate in (Guthrie and Parker, 1989). Organizational legitimacy occurs where a firm’s 
activities are suitably aligned with the expectations bestowed on it by the public 
(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Therefore, where corporate governance is considered 
through the lens of legitimacy theory, the focus remains on how successfully the 
organization has adopted those governance norms imposed on it by society. Of particular 
interest is that where organizations do adopt a legitimacy perspective, symbolic 
isomorphism with environmental norms is often enough to satisfy stakeholder concerns 
and secure legitimacy (De Villiers and Van Staden, 2006). Legitimacy theory may serve 
as a useful indicator of a firm’s commitment to good governance. While codes of 
governance and much of the literature focus on the agency relationship and the effect it 
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has on governance, there are a number of other explanations for an organizations actions 
that should not be ignored when attempting to review the nominations practices and 
motivations behind the adoption of board seats.  
 
Board of Directors 
Not unlike some definitions of corporate governance, for example that of the OECD 
(2004), definitions of the board of directors focus on the responsibilities that they have to 
the various stakeholders of the organization. One such definition comes from Molz 
(1985:86) who describes the board as ‘a body entrusted with power to make economic 
decisions affecting the well-being of investors’ capital, employees’ security, 
communities’ economic health and executives’ power and perquisites’. Given such a 
definition it is understandable that the role and composition of the board has been 
awarded significant attention. However, some questions regarding the board remain 
unanswered. The literature on the initial motivations behind non-executive directors’ 
acceptance of a board position is limited at best. Little attention has also been given to the 
nominations process of firms, with the introduction of a nominations committee under the 
Code appearing to satisfy many questions regarding this practice. These are areas that 
would arguably inform many of the practices of the board of director and as such warrant 
specific attention.  
 
Role of the Board of Directors 
It has been suggested that an organizations corporate governance actions may be 
explained by any number of the theoretical perspectives outlined above (Hung, 1998, 
Brennan, 2006). Perhaps then it is possible to consider board nomination practices using 
these same theoretical perspectives. In an effort to better determine the plausibility of this 
link it is important first to consider how organizational theories affect this role. The 
emphasis placed on monitoring and incentivizing top management by boards operating in 
organizations that adopt an agency perspective support such a statement (Rutherford et 
al., 2007). The maintenance of the organizations role within the environment it operates 
is an important function of the board from an institutional theory perspective (Hung, 
1998). Furthermore within the resource dependence theory of the organization there is an 
expectation that a well structured board will improve external relationships and increase 
control over external resources (Hillman et al., 2000). From a stakeholder theory 
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perspective an important function of the board is that of coordinating the objectives of all 
of the firm’s stakeholders (Hung, 1998). Molz (1985:86) concludes that the board is the 
‘internal authority within the corporation’ and as such its foremost responsibility is that 
of maintaining control over all the other actors in its environment. The author further 
asserts that at the highest level attaining organizational legitimacy is the aim of this 
corporate control.  
 
Mace (1972) suggests that duties of the board of directors in all companies should include 
advising the management team, serving as a power that the upper echelons can be held 
accountable to, and acting as a body that can intervene in a crisis situation. Denis and 
McConnell (2003) note that while the emphasis of board responsibilities in the US is 
placed on maximizing shareholder wealth, European boards are often expected to 
consider share value maximization as only one of many tasks.  The role assigned to the 
board of directors arguably affects the optimal composition of its members. As such 
much has been written regarding the optimal composition of the board in both the 
academic literature and in government reports.  
 
Non-Executive Directors 
One recommendation stemming from the Combined Code is that independent, non-
executive directors should make up at least half of the board of directors (Code, 2006). 
While the Code itself sets out a list of criteria outlining the attributes of an independent 
director, many other views on optimal board composition have been offered. Indeed it 
has been argued that composition of boards is an area that has received too much interest 
at the expense of discovering more about the motives and experience of individual 
directors on these boards (Roberts, 2002). It has been suggested that organizational 
performance can be improved by increasing board effectiveness (Brown, 2007). 
However, Hung (1998) argues that there is no single perspective that can explain board 
effectiveness.  
 
Some authors, in line with the Combined Code propose that the most effective boards 
should contain a majority of non-executive directors (Roberts et al., 2005, Dahya and Mc 
Connell, 2007). While Choi et al. (2007) suggest non-executive directors can prevent 
self-serving behavior on the part of management, Dahya and Mc Connell (2007) focus on 
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the improved performance that they believe comes from increasing the number of non-
executive directors on the board. Petra (2005) however points out that having 
independently structured boards may not always be the most appropriate method of 
preventing poor governance. He supports this statement by examining the boards of many 
companies in which governance failures have occurred, and found that at the time the 
majority of these boards were made up of independent directors. Furthermore, questions 
have been raised about the threat non-executive directors pose to board unity and the 
excess costs incurred by increasing their numbers on boards (Young, 2000). The 
preference for a majority of executive directors on boards has also been highlighted by a 
number of other authors (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991, Muth and Donaldson, 1998).  
While board composition is an important area of research, within an Irish context it is the 
nominations processes that have generated a lot of interest. The nominations procedures 
adopted by Irish companies in sourcing non-executive directors have been highlighted as 
a consistent source of concern (O'Higgins, 2002, Brennan and McDermott, 2004, 
O'Regan et al., 2005). O’ Higgins (2002) refers to the ‘old boys’ network’ in place in the 
Irish corporate environment and acknowledges the dangers this presents to women and 
minorities attempting to join boards as non-executive directors. Brennan and McDermott 
(2004) expressed concern regarding poor disclosure in annual reports and lack of 
compliance with the Combined Code regarding the establishment of nominations 
committees. 
 
Venture Capitalists as Non-Executive Directors 
The lack of research into the relationship between venture capitalists and the boards they 
sit on has been stressed by Gabrielsson and Huse (2002). Much of the research that does 
exist focuses on the role of the venture capitalist on the board and the effect of venture 
capital investment on floatation (Deakins et al., 2000, Van Den Bergh and Levrau, 2002, 
Gabrielsson and Huse, 2002, Filatotchev, 2006). Fried et al. (1998) note that the boards 
of venture capitalist backed firms often appoint very few internal directors with the 
majority of board positions being adopted by external venture capitalists. Interestingly, a 
distinction has been made between venture capitalist appointed non-executives and other 
non-executives. Deakins et al. (2000) suggest that venture capitalist appointed non-
executives could be recognized as resource based appointments as opposed to other 
directors who can be considered agency based appointments. This view is a useful 
 9 
example of how the motivations and expectations of non-executive directors may vary. 
Venture capitalist compensation depends on the success of those organizations in which 
they invest and sitting on the board of directors of these companies is one method of 
protecting this investment (Van Den Bergh and Levrau, 2002). The question arises then, 
of whether or not venture capitalist non-executive directors can be considered 
independent when acting on these boards. This research goes some way to answering that 
question. 
 
The above literature contributes to our understanding of the board of directors and what 
their various roles and responsibilities should be. By focusing significant amounts of 
attention on these areas the literature imposes a certain importance on them. While this is 
certainly beneficial, extending research into other areas such as motivations and 
nominations practices will add to the literature on the board of directors and draw 
attention to the effect of the Combined Code of corporate governance on these 
motivations and nominations procedures.  
 
Research Methodology  
This aim of this research is to address the nomination and motivations of Irish Non-
Executive Directors of listed companies. The purpose is threefold. 
 
I. To develop an understanding of the nominations procedures in place in Irish plcs in 
an effort to determine the commitment to good corporate governance in these 
organizations. 
II. To discover the effect that increased corporate governance requirements have had 
on the motivations of non-executive directors to adopt these board positions.  
 
The research philosophy adopted for the purpose of this paper is that of interpretive 
approach. The interpretivist epistemology allows researchers to better examine the 
natural and cultural sciences, subjects which have been inhibited by the functionalist 
approach to research (Burrell and Morgan, 2000). Within the interpretivist paradigm 
phenomenology and grounded theory have been highlighted as useful approaches to 
research (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). The authors note that both of the interpretivist 
methodologies share a desire to ‘emphasize the contribution of human subjectivity (i.e. 
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intention) to knowledge without thereby sacrificing the objectivity of knowledge’ 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1998:193). The phenomenological approach expects researchers to 
suspend any inherent ontological assumptions regarding the environment in question in 
order to better facilitate an understanding of the common knowledge and beliefs that are 
held by those within that environment (Goulding, 1999). This research philosophy is 
particularly suited in understanding human action (Patton, 2002) and as such will offer a 
unique insight into research regarding the motivation and nomination of non-executive 
directors.  
 
Data Collection 
In a departure from methods more commonly used for research into corporate governance 
and indeed the board of directors, this research adopts a qualitative approach. With the 
exception of a few (O'Higgins, 2002, Roberts, 2002) most research studies into the board 
of directors have adopted a quantitative approach (Dahya and Mc Connell, 2007, 
Baysinger and Butler, 1985, Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). While this research is 
essential in developing a broad understanding of corporate governance practice, the use 
of a qualitative approach in the form of in-depth interviews in this case allowed for 
greater probing and interaction with the interviewee than other methods provide. For the 
purpose of this study interviews were carried out with eight non-executive directors 
currently sitting on the boards of Irish listed companies. Purposeful sampling was 
adopted with the requirement that the non-executive directors interviewed were board 
appointees of Irish listed companies. Of the eight non-executive directors interviewed 
only one was a female non-executive. The interviews were carried out in various 
locations with most participants choosing to meet at their workplace, although two 
preferred to meet at a neutral environment. The length of interview ranged from 30 
minutes to 55 minutes. The interviews took place under the guarantee of anonymity for 
both the directors themselves and the organizations which they were attached to. The 
number of directorships held by each director ranged from one to fifteen plus. Experience 
levels also ranged with one director having less than a years experience on a board with 
the highest level of experience recorded as more than a decade. An interview guide was 
drawn up to enable the key topics of motivations and nominations to be addressed. 
Interview guides are recommended by Patton (2002) for a number of reasons. It acts as a 
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method of ensuring that the limited interview time is managed appropriately and it 
reminds the interviewer of key subject areas while not limiting the scope of response.  
 
Data Analysis 
While the interviews were recorded for subsequent transcription, notes were also made to 
identify any non-linguistic emphasis added by the interviewees. Transcription was 
undertaken on a continuing basis throughout the research and reviewed to ensure 
accuracy of transcriptions. Analysis was carried out in tandem with the research 
interviews to allow developing themes to be probed more acutely. A coding system was 
developed as the first stage in analysis to highlight key themes and group similar units of 
data into easily identifiable categories (Saunders et al., 2003). Coffey and Atkinson 
(1996) offer a useful illustration of how data interpretation can be broken down into the 
three stages of data display, exploring the codes and categories and transforming the 
coded data into meaningful data. This strategy was loosely adopted in the interpretation 
of data.  
 
Discussion 
Motivations of Non-Executive Directors 
The non-executive directors interviewed perceived an industry interest and the valid 
contribution they had to offer to be their main motives for adopting the position. The 
motivations of non-executive directors in adopting board positions may offer some 
insight into other areas of board research such as……... Director motivations may also 
provide some insight into the extent that corporate governance factors into the decision 
making of non-executives when adopting board positions.  
 
‘There has to be an element of ego to it in so far as a sense that you can make a 
contribution to the organization and hopefully that that organization will be a better 
organization, however you define better, for your presence’ (Director D) 
 
‘I have a huge interest in the … industry in general and in … in particular. Em so em 
em it was, it was something that you know that eh, it appealed to because of the fact 
that it’s a company that I know well and its an industry that I’m very interested in 
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and I though it would, I could make a valid contribution to the strategic direction’ 
(Director A) 
 
However these motivations were second to acknowledgements that most accepted the 
position because they were offered it and did not actively seek out non-executive 
directorships.  
 
‘I was asked’ (Director A) 
 
‘I was asked first of all by the founder of the company to become a director of the 
company at the time it was a private company em when the company grew and was 
about to undergo a floatation on the New York Stock Exchange NASDAQ and the 
Irish Stock Exchange, there was to be a resignation of directors and a reconstituted 
board and again he asked me would I stay on because he felt it was important to 
have some of the old board with some of the new board post flotation I said I 
would……’ (Director B) 
 
‘In both cases I was contacted by the chairman and asked to come and have a 
conversation. I’d no forewarning of either of them … I felt deeply honored to be 
asked. I felt very very interested and deeply honored … I’d be very strongly 
interested in Ireland’s industrial development and its export development.’  
(Director D) 
 
‘You drift into these situations … you just, you get a name for doing it and it’s of 
interest to you.’ (Director C) 
 
While the board of directors is charged with much more responsibility in theory, the ease 
with which non-executive directors take up positions on boards could suggest that this 
increased accountability is not, in practice, a concern. Furthermore, the admission by 
many directors that they were approached to take up the position suggests that the 
nominations process is not a very rigorous one.  
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Interestingly whereas non-executive directors viewed their own motivations in a positive 
light, they offered less favorable views as to the possible motivations of other non-
executive directors. Although career development and knowledge accumulation were 
highlighted as some of the suspected reasons that other non-executives take up board 
positions on plcs, more often monetary compensation, ego, and vanity along with the 
networking connections these positions afford were highlighted.  
 
‘We’ve all seen I suppose a lot of non-executive directors being appointed post 
retirement from either private practices accountants or from whatever they may be in 
and there would be I suspect those circumstances a lot of people taking non-
executive directorships because A it provides ongoing remuneration for limited days 
work and that is a, in my view, bad reason for becoming a non-executive director.’ 
(Director B) 
 
‘A-lot of people do it to keep their hands in after they’ve retired because em the 
obvious reasons, you suddenly go from having a day job to having no job and they 
want to maintain contacts in the corporate world so the do it to that end, and to have 
income.’ (Director C) 
 
‘For people who aren’t in our business there’s a massive amount of ego.’ (Director 
E) 
 
For the most part, the non-executive directors interviewed appear to adopt an opinion of 
their peers which is very similar to that of the agency perspective. Self-serving 
motivations are highlighted as the reason for joining boards and those altruistic 
motivations that they apply to themselves are not reflected in their view of others. 
Although non-executive directors highlighted remuneration as a possible motivation for 
others, they often made a point of ruling it out as a personal motivation with one director 
indicating that it was not sufficient enough to provide an explanation of their acceptance 
of the role. One director interviewed acknowledged the possibility that some directors 
remain unfamiliar with the Combined Code, having never read it. A lack of familiarity 
with the Combined Code and the responsibilities that it imposes on directors could go 
some way to explaining the ease with which non-executives appear to accept positions on 
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plc boards. Arguably, those directors who are aware of the details of the combined code 
would be less likely to take a position of such responsibility without first considering 
both the corporate governance status and financial history of the organization.  
  
Nominations Procedures  
The nominations procedure of a plc is a good indicator of how important corporate 
governance is to the firm. The structure of the procedure also offers insight into what 
attributes a firm might look for from it’s non-executive directors and in doing so 
highlights the organizational theory that they most likely adopt. Interestingly the directors 
questioned had no particular knowledge of appointments to non-executive positions other 
than their own.  
 
‘I don’t have a great deal of experience with that’ (Director C) 
 
‘The procedures are pretty simple. Is there any controversy? Eh, no’ (Director E) 
 
‘They (nominations committee) can make recommendations to the full board and the 
full board would then co-opt that non-executive director …’ (Director B) 
 
While one non-executive director questioned did suggest that the nominations procedure 
can be ‘complicated’ and another described the appointment of a non-executive director 
as being a process with steps involved for the most part this question elicited a very 
passive response from the interviewees. It appears that while directors have strong views 
on what attributes non-executives should possess and what the role should entail, they 
don’t appear to regard the nominations process, which could be considered the 
foundation for establishing a good board, with the same concern.  
Directors themselves acknowledged that people had ‘favorites’ when looking to fill board 
positions and that positions were sometimes filled based on recommendations. Such 
assertions not only support the argument put forward by O’Higgins (2002), they also 
point to a less than impressive commitment to good corporate governance on the part of 
the organizations. Were such organizations interested in improving corporate governance 
standards, the introduction of a formalized system of appointments may be of benefit.  
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Preferred Attributes of Non-Executive Directors 
In her study of effective directors, O’Higgins (2002) highlighted seven characteristics 
recognized as important determinants of effectiveness. These included clarity of thought, 
experience, interpersonal skills, ability to contribute positively, commitment, 
independence, and ability to command respect.  
 
By allowing non-executive directors to highlight those attributes that they appreciate in 
other directors some sign may be given as to the organizational theory they favor. When 
the interviewees were questioned as to what attributes they preferred in nominees they 
highlighted a number that offered insight into the possible organizational perspective 
adopted. Attributes such as ‘integrity’, ‘financial or accounting skills’ and an ‘analytical 
mind’ were all discussed as important requirements, however, it was experience that was 
consistently highlighted as an important characteristic.   
 
‘I presume what they are looking for is people with em, industry experience is a plus 
but it’s not absolutely necessary … if I was picking people to run a board I’d look at 
their analytical skills and their openness because the board works really well when 
the board members are open with one another and communicate freely’ (Director A) 
 
‘What they should look for is a non-executive director who can bring value to the 
executive directors who either through his experience in general business or more 
specifically his experience in the business of the company … so I think a non-
executive director should bring some specific set of skills that have a relevance to 
the company of which he’s a non-executive director’ (Director B) 
 
‘It’s very helpful if the director knows the sector that he’s going to be a director of 
so past experience and knowledge of the sector is hugely important’ (Director C) 
 
Interestingly independence was only addressed once as an important attribute 
 
‘Typically they want those NEDs to arrive eh to be independent, they also, coupled 
with that need them to arrive with enough, sufficient industry knowledge, sufficient 
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experience, however you want to define that, that they’re not educating them all the 
time … ’ (Director E) 
 
Whilst the Combined Code focuses on the agency relationship and as such highlights the 
importance of independence in non-executive directors, the directors interviewed offered 
suggestions on other areas that they perceive as being important. One such characteristic 
is that of experience. As mentioned previously, the ‘old boys’ network’ is recognized as 
playing a large part in the nominations of non-executive directors in Ireland (O'Higgins, 
2002). Perhaps independence in not raised as a concern by directors as it may cause their 
own position to be questioned. One director discussed how he sits on the board of 
directors of an organization that his own firm provides professional services too but 
believes that this does not conflict with his ability to remain an independent director. 
Arguably, given the small environment in which organizations operate in Ireland in 
comparison to their European counterparts, maintaining connections with other resource 
providers is considered more beneficial than ensuring non-executives remain independent 
and free of conflict. As such, organizations may focus on the resource benefits of 
appointing a new non-executive director and as such seek out appointees who can offer 
some connections to the external environment. 
 
Venture Capitalists as Non-Executive Directors 
As mentioned previously a number of those directors interviewed pointed out that they 
adopted the position because it ‘comes with the job’ of being a venture capitalist. Venture 
capitalists who act as non-executive directors arguably raise questions as to their 
independence and ability to make decisions based on the best interests of the 
organizations stakeholders rather than their own shareholders. 
 
‘There’s an inherent conflict between your duty to my underlying investors which is 
I’m representing my shareholding on the fund and the overall eh responsibility to 
shareholders as a whole. I can’t think of a situation where there’s actually been a 
difference between what would be good for us and what would be good for the 
overall shareholders but I’m sure you know it can arise and there is a prospect of it.’ 
(Director C) 
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This conflict of interests is not apparent to all venture capitalists acting as non-executive 
directors.  
 
‘We would consider ourselves independent. Now would we pass the acid test that’s 
now used in the Code of governance, em we probably wouldn’t actually because of 
the size of the shareholding we represent … ’ (Director E) 
 
The role of the venture capitalist on the board of directors has previously been addressed 
(Gabrielsson and Huse, 2002, Van Den Bergh and Levrau, 2002), especially in the 
context of the IPO (Filatotchev, 2006, Suchard). However the independence of venture 
capitalists as non-executive directors has received less attention. As such, further research 
is needed in this area to determine the ability of venture capitalists to act as independent 
non-executive directors on the boards of firms which they invest in.  
 
Limitations of Research 
The study has several limitations. It is a small scale preliminary study carried out in an 
Irish context and as such the discussion cannot be considered representative of how 
boards operate in a wider environment. The scope of the study was limited to a small 
number of issues and as such did not address other relevant issues regarding the board of 
directors. Research into the area of venture capitalists as non-executive directors is not a 
major consideration of this paper and this area may be better suited to a separate study.  
 
Conclusion 
The above investigation offers important insight into the actions of non-executive 
directors at a practical level. Furthermore it often highlights the gaps between literature 
on the board of directors and the actual practice. This research is carried out in an Irish 
context and as such offers a unique insight into corporate governance and the board of 
directors in Ireland. It was also carried out at a time when the economic landscape was 
changing dramatically and directors were perhaps becoming more aware of their 
responsibilities and the scrutiny they could become subject to at the hands of the public. 
In relation to the Anglo Irish bank affair, one director questioned whether or not all 
members of the board should have been held to such a high level of accountability as the 
scandal broke. This again reinforces the observation that non-executive directors have 
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not, up until now, been subject to increased responsibility that should be imposed on 
them by the Code.  
 
This paper addressed the motives of non-executive directors as it was felt that this under-
researched area could add some insight into the effect that changes in the corporate 
governance environment has had on the adoption of the particular position. By 
highlighting the different reasons that non-executive directors choose to adopt this 
position it is hoped that this paper will contribute to the literature assessing the impact of 
corporate governance codes. Whereas a number of papers have looked at the effect of the 
Combined Code on organizations as a whole (Mc Neil and Rimmington, 2004, Pass, 
2006), focusing on the effect of corporate governance on individual motives lends a 
different perspective to corporate governance debates.  
 
It has been previously suggested that there is no place for corporate governance in times 
of economic success (Cadbury, 2000) and perhaps this has again been the case in recent 
years. Nominations processes remain largely informal and possibly continue to adhere to 
‘old-boys network’ ideals (O'Higgins, 2002). Non-executives are proving to have adopted 
board positions in an unconsidered manner. It would appear then that non-executive 
directors have not felt the full weight of the Combined Codes efforts to increase director 
responsibilities and improve good governance.  
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